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Introduction 
 
Samuels and Shugart (2010) advanced a theory of how the differences in the 
executive institution of political systems affect the organization and behavior of 
political parties.  Before their work, the analysis of the relationship between 
the executive institution and party organization had focused on party discipline.  
Some studies, such as Linz (1994), pointed out that the discipline of parliament 
parties is likely to be weakened under a presidential system in which the 
executive office does not have the power to dissolve the parliament. The 
president, as the head of the executive, is forced to negotiate with individual 
members of the parliament from low-disciplined political parties in order to 
establish laws.  Under such negotiations, patronage is a prevalent method to 
acquire agreement from individual MPs.  However, other scholars, such as 
Cheibub (2007), argue that there are cases, even under the presidential system, 
where the strong legislative powers of the president or the legislative institution 
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can strengthen party discipline.1 
     In their study, Samuels and Shugart (2010) systematically show that 
variation in the executive institution of political systems affects the organization 
of political parties.  Describing the party members (MPs) as the “principals” 
and the party leaders as the “agents” who are delegated authority to build 
popular support and pursue policy interests, the two scholars argue that 
differences in the executive institution affect the principal-agent relationship in 
a party organization. 
     Under parliamentarism, party members (the principals) can maintain the 
accountability of their party leader through his/her selection and deselection.  
Thus, the executive and legislative elements of parties are fused in 
parliamentarized parties.  Under presidentialism, where elections of the head 
of the executive and the legislature are independently held, parties delegate 
strong authority over presidential elections and government administration to 
their leader (or their candidate in presidential elections).  As such, 
presidentialized parties face difficulty in holding their leader accountable, 
“separating the executive and legislative elements of government into two 
independent branches also breaks parties into two separate branches, one in the 
                                                        
1 Political parties in Indonesia have rather strong organizational discipline even under the 
country’s presidential system.  This strength can be mainly attributed to the effect of the 
electoral system.  With Indonesia’s proportional representation system, where votes are 
counted on a party basis, parliamentary members are more likely to be dependent on their 
own parties.  In addition, parliamentary candidates have to obey party policy because the 
party executive has the authority to draw up the party’s candidate list.  Although an 
open-list system has been in effect since the 2004 parliamentary elections, the central 
executives of the parties still hold strong power over deciding on party candidates.  
Furthermore, parliamentary members find it difficult to oppose executive policy because 
they could be deprived of their party membership as well as parliamentary seats if they 
went against party rules or transfer to other parties.   
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legislature and one in the executive” (Samuels & Shugart 2010, 38).  In other 
words, parliamentalism, where the relationship between voters, parties, and the 
executive is hierarchical, can prevent agency problems, whereas presidentialism, 
where parties and the executive are separately elected, cannot control problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard since parties as the “principal” have 
neither authority to elect nor dismiss the president as the “agent.”   
     This logic implies that variations in the executive institution lead to 
differences in the organizational characteristics of parties, the methods of 
selecting party leaders, and election strategy.  For example, parties under 
presidentialism select their presidential candidates not from insiders who can 
skillfully manage party organization, but from outsiders who can nationally 
appeal to voters.  They do not dismiss the president even if he/she neglects the 
party’s support base or policy preferences.  Moreover, since presidential 
candidates have to appeal to constituencies broader than the party support base, 
they tend to run election campaigns with their own organizational and financial 
resources rather than those of the political party.  These behavioral patterns 
show that the separation of powers can be seen both at the constitutional level 
and at the party organizational level.  Samuels and Shugart call this 
“presidentialization of political parties” (Samuels & Shugart 2010, 6).   
     This paper discusses whether “presidentialization of political parties,” as 
argued by Samuel and Shugart, can be seen in Indonesia.  After the collapse of 
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, democratic political reform was 
successively implemented in Indonesia, which introduced a 
separation-of-power system.  Direct presidential elections have been held 
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every five years since 2004.  This paper will analyze the changes in party 
organization in Indonesia under the newly introduced presidential system. 
     The study of Indonesian political parties since democratization can be 
divided into two types, one on the party system and the other on party 
organization or party functional weakness.  The former type focuses mainly on 
the relationship between social cleavages and the party system, arguing that the 
Indonesia’s party system is relatively stable due to the socio-religious cleavage 
called “aliran” (Mietzner 2009b; Sherlock 2004; Ufen 2008a; Ufen 2008b).2  The 
latter type of studies pay more attention to the weakness of party organization, 
criticizing their poor performance at representation and accountability (Tan 
2006; Tomsa 2010; Ufen 2009).  For example, Tomsa argues that even the 
Golkar party, the ruling party under the Soeharto regime, which is seen as 
having the strongest party organization, has been plagued by internal factional 
struggles and revolts by regional chapters (Tomsa 2006; Tomsa 2008).  Slater 
(2004) is critical of party politics in the post-democratization period 
characterizing it as an elite cartel. This is a similar perspective as the analysis of 
Robison and Hadiz (2004), who term it oligarchic politics.  Case studies on 
local politics also point out that political parties play only a minor role in 
decentralized regional governance (see discussion in Section 3 below).   
     However, only a few studies so far have analyzed the relationship 
                                                        
2 There have been controversies among Indonesian scholars about whether socio-religious 
cleavages or aliran are still effective on electoral behavior in the post-democratization era.  
Liddle and Mujani (2007) argue that the influence of aliran has been disappearing from 
elections since democratization.  On the other hand, King (2003), Ananta at al. (2004), 
Baswedan (2004), and Kawamura and Higashikata (2009) show that the effects of aliran can 
be still seen. 
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between the executive institution and political parties in democratized 
Indonesia.  Ufen (2006; 2008a) has sought to show that direct presidential 
elections have influenced party organization, arguing that the rise of 
presidential parties and presidentialization of parties can be seen since 2004.  
His concept of a presidential party, however, only means one that is a political 
machine for a presidential candidate, a concept that is similar to what in this 
study is called a “personal party”.  Presidentialization of parties in Ufen’s 
analysis also only indicates a phenomenon where presidential candidates 
appeal directly to the voters and present their populist policies directly through 
the mass media, since direct presidential elections erode the importance of 
party organization and ideology.  Ufen’s analysis, therefore, only shows that 
the introduction of direct presidential elections has prompted presidential 
candidates to build their own parties, and he does not theoretically discuss how 
presidentialism affects party organization.  In short, we should differentiate 
Ufen’s “presidential parties” from Samuel and Shugart’s “presidentialized 
parties”. 
     This study analyzes the relationship between the executive institution and 
the organization of political parties in Indonesia, a point which has so far 
attracted little attention.  It examines whether Indonesia’s political parties have 
been presidentialized since democratization because of the implementation of 
direct presidential elections.  Its finding shows that not all political parties 
have become presidentialized.  The most advanced presidentialized party is 
Golkar, a party that has maintained strong regional chapters and supporting 
organizations since the Soeharto period.  Other parties, however, do not 
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exhibit any presidentialization.  This study argues that two factors determine 
whether a political party is presidentialized or not: the degree of organizational 
strength and its chances of winning presidential elections. 
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I presents a 
general overview of Indonesian presidentialism and the party system.  Section 
II analyzes how direct presidential elections have influenced the party 
organization of two types of political parties, namely, those that are strongly 
organized and those that are personal parties.  The analysis will also 
demonstrate that the influence of the executive institution on the organization 
of parties changes in accordance with the chances of winning presidential 
elections.  Section III discusses the influence of the separation of powers on 
party organization at the regional level and will seek to show that the direct 
election of regional heads, implemented since 2005, has had a stronger impact 
on party organization at the local level than at the national level.  The final 
section summarizes the above discussion and from the analysis offers 
implications about the relationship between the executive institution and 
political party organization in newly democratizing countries.   
 
I. Directly elected President and Party System in Indonesia 
 
The current presidential system of Indonesia came into being in 2004 as a result 
of the gradual political institutional reforms following the fall of President 
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in May 1998.  Ever since independence in 1945, 
except for the nine years of so‐called “Parliamentary Democracy” during the 
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1950s, the president was constitutionally supposed to be elected by the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakayt: MPR), the legislative 
body at the top of the state organs.  The president, however, could control the 
MPR by acquiring the authority to appoint most of its members.  Soeharto, 
who gained power in 1966, succeeded in consolidating the authoritarian regime 
originally established by Soekarno through his control, with military backing, 
of the ruling party, Golkar (Golongan Karya: the Functional Group).  In so doing, 
Soeharto was elected as the president seven consecutive times and maintain his 
rule for 32 years (Kawamura 2003).   
     With the start of democratization in 1998, however, change was imposed 
on the Indonesian presidential system.  The activities of political parties were 
liberalized while the president’s massive powers were eliminated through a 
succession of constitutional amendments.  In October 1999 the MPR elected 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri as the president and the 
vice-president respectively in the first ever free election.  Then in July 2001 
President Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached by the MPR because of severe 
conflicts between the president and the legislature. 
     The political turmoil under Abdurrahman Wahid’s government aroused 
the nation’s awareness of the need for further institutional reforms to stabilize 
the position of the president.  As a result, the third and fourth constitutional 
amendments of 2001 and 2002 provided that the president should be elected not 
by the MPR but directly by the people, and that the impeachment of the 
president should require the consent of the judiciary so as to prevent undue 
8 
 
influence on the position of the president from partisan interests in parliament.3  
     The first ever direct presidential election was held in 2004.  The election 
system provides for the president’s election in the same year as the general 
election for the House of People’s Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: 
DPR) and the House of Local Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah: DPD), 
which is once every five years.4  Candidates for president and vice-president 
have to run as a pair and be backed by a political party (or a coalition of 
political parties) that has a certain share of parliamentary seats.  In the 2004 
presidential election, the Presidential Election Law provided that only parties 
(or coalitions of parties) with more than 20% of the vote in the parliamentary 
election or 15% of the parliamentary seats could put up a candidate. In the 2009 
presidential election, the conditions for putting up candidates were raised to 
more than 25% of the vote or 20% of parliamentary seats.  An independent 
candidate is not allowed to run for election. 
     A presidential candidate does not win an election simply by getting a 
majority of the votes, and he/she needs to fulfill other conditions to win: a 
candidate in the 2009 presidential election had to win more than 20% of the vote 
                                                        
3 For the institutional characteristics of Indonesia’s presidentialism, see Kawamura (2013). 
4 The House of Local Representatives (DPD) was created by the third constitutional 
amendment of 2001, and came into being after the 2004 general election. Under the Suharto 
regime, the MPR consisted of members of the DPR, the representatives of local 
governments, and representatives of functional groups. Although membership by the 
representatives of functional groups was abolished after democratization, the 
representatives of local governments were reorganized into a single chamber with 
members being directly elected by the people.  The DPD has the authority to propose bills 
concerning issues of regional autonomy and can participate in the deliberations on such 
legislation, but it does not have powers of approval.  Elections for members of the DPD 
employ the system of single non-transferable vote in a four-member provincial district with 
competition among non-partisan candidates. 
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in more than a half of the provinces.  When no candidate acquires a majority 
vote, the top two candidates proceed to a second round of voting.  An 
incumbent president can be reelected only once. 
     Thus Indonesia has created two institutional devices to secure political 
stability. One is an electoral cycle wherein the parliamentary elections are held 
immediately before the presidential election, and the second is the condition of 
allowing only relatively large parties the right to put up presidential candidates, 
which promotes the likelihood that the party of the president will coincide with 
the majority party in the parliament.  Nevertheless, it has been extremely 
difficult for the Indonesian president to maintain a stable support base in the 
parliament because of the high number of parties with representatives.  The 
effective number of parliamentary parties was 5.3 after the 1999 elections that 
took place immediately after democratization. It was 7.1 after the 2004 elections, 
and 6.2 following the 2009 elections (see Table 1).  The share of parliamentary 
seats won by the leading party in each election was 30.6% for the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan: PDIP) in 
the 1999 elections, 23.1% for the Golkar Party in the 2004 elections, and 26.4% 
for the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat: PD) in the 2009 elections, showing that 
even the leading party has never come close to holding a majority in the 
parliament. 
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     The party system in Indonesia, typical of polarized pluralism, has come 
about as a result of the proportional representation system which was 
intentionally adopted to reflect the country’s multiplicity of ethnic, religious, 
and regional cleavages.  Polarized pluralism has also been caused by the 
springing up of new parties that seek the support of swing voters.  Since 
democratization, Indonesian voters have lost their party identification, resulting 
in volatile electoral behavior. 5  Furthermore, because the right to put up 
presidential candidates is restricted to major parties, potential candidates who 
                                                        
5 Total electoral volatility was 23 in the 2004 general election and 28.7 in the 2009 general 
election.  On the other hand, block (cleavage) volatility between secularism and Islam was 
only 1.5 in 2004 and 9.5 in 2009.  Although swing votes between the socio-religious 
cleavage increased in 2009, the majority of voters changed their supporting parties within 
cleavages.  According to the author’s estimates (Kawamura 2010), voters who swung to a 
different party within a cleavage accounted for 93.7% of total voters in 2004 and 66.8% in 
2009. 
Table 1  Election Results of the House of People's Representatives (DPR) 1999-2009
1999 General Elections 2004 General Elections 2009 General Elections
% of Votes
% of Seats
(Number of Seats)
% of Votes
% of Seats
(Number of Seats)
% of Votes
% of Seats
(Number of
Seats)
Demokrat Party (PD) --- --- --- 7.5% 10.2% (56) 20.9% 26.4% (148)
Golkar 22.4% 24.0% (120) 21.6% 23.1% (127) 14.5% 18.9% (106)
Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDIP)
33.7% 30.6% (153) 18.5% 19.8% (109) 14.0% 16.8% (94)
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 1.4% 1.4% (7) 7.3% 8.2% (45) 7.9% 10.2% (57)
National Mandate Party (PAN) 7.1% 6.8% (34) 6.4% 9.6% (53) 6.0% 8.2% (46)
United Development Party (PPP) 10.7% 11.6% (58) 8.2% 10.6% (58) 5.3% 6.8% (38)
National Awakening Party (PKB) 12.6% 10.2% (51) 10.6% 9.5% (52) 4.9% 5.0% (28)
Great Indonesia Movement Party
(Gerindra)
--- --- --- --- --- --- 4.5% 4.6% (26)
People's Conscience Party (Hanura) --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.8% 3.0% (17)
Others 12.1% 15.4% (77) 17.3% 9.1% (50) 18.3% 0.0% (0)
Total 100 100 (500) 100 100 (550) 100 100 (560)
Effective Number of Parties 5.06 5.31 8.55 7.11 9.59 6.21
Source : Compiled and calculated from various documents of the General Election Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum: KPU).
Note : The percentage of parliamentary seats and the legislative effective number of parties after the 1999 general elections has
been calculated with 38 seats of the military/police faction.  The military/police faction was abolished totally in October 2004.
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lose in the primary election of those major parties tend to establish their own 
new parties. 
     Since so many parties win seats and there is no majority party in the 
parliament, parties have to build coalitions to win the presidential election.  In 
the 2004 presidential election, four out of the five pairs of candidates for 
president and vice-president were put up by coalitions of parties.  The 
winning Golkar party put up Wiranto paired with Salahuddin Wahid in a 
coalition with the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa: PKB) 
and four minor parties.  The PDIP, the second largest party, ran with Megawati 
and Hasyim Muzadi in coalition with the Welfare and Peace Party (Partai Damai 
Sejahtera: PDS), a minor Christian party.  The PD in cooperation with two 
minor parties ran Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Yusuf Kalla as their 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates.  The fourth coalition grouped 
the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: PKS) with the National 
Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional: PAN) and seven other parties in support 
of Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo.  Only the United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: PPP), which had failed in coalitional 
negotiations, ran its own candidate. 
     In the 2009 presidential election, the number of candidates decreased to 
three pairs, both because the threshold of 2.5% of the vote for party 
representation in the parliamentary prevented small parties from acquiring 
parliamentary seats and because the condition to putting up presidential 
candidates was tightened significantly.  Still all presidential candidates were 
put up by coalitions of political parties.  The election winner was the PD, 
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which became the ruling party, in coalition with four Islamic parties who had 
run Yudhoyono, the incumbent president, paired with Boediono.  The second 
coalition put the Golkar party with the new People's Conscience Party (Partai 
Hati Nurani Rakyat: Hanura) which ran Wiranto with Kall, the incumbent 
vice-president, as their president and vice president candidate respectively.  
The third coalition was formed by the PDIP with the new Great Indonesia 
Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya: Gerindra) whose presidential 
and vice-presidential candidates were Megawati and Prabowo Subianto.   
     The past two presidential elections saw complicated coalitional 
negotiations before election campaigning started.  While Indonesia’s party 
system is strongly defined by a socio-religious cleavage between secularism and 
Islam, parties are forced to make coalitions with those from different cleavages 
in order to maximize their electoral support in presidential elections.  Since 
there is more than one party competing within a cleavage, there is more than 
one possibility for forming a coalition.  Thus, political parties seek any possible 
combination for a coalition during the two months between the parliamentary 
elections and the presidential election. 
     Moreover, before parties negotiate coalitions, fierce power struggles take 
place within the parties in the course of nominating a presidential candidate.  
This process shows the organizational characteristics of each party.  The next 
section examines how the direct presidential election affects party organization. 
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II. Indonesia’s Presidential System and Party Organization 
 
A. Organization-based Parties and Figure-based Parties 
The origin of Indonesian political parties can be traced back to the 
pre-independence period before 1945.  During the Parliamentary Democracy 
period in the 1950s, the four major parties that could mobilize large numbers of 
supporters bitterly competed for power.6  But under the authoritarian regime 
of Soeharto, political parties were weakened by government intervention.  The 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was totally broken down by the military 
after the so-called coup attempt by the Thirtieth of September Movement in 
1965.  In 1973 the Soeharto government forced political parties to merge into 
two camps, one for Islamic parties which became become the PPP and the other 
for secular and Christian parties which formed the Indonesian Democratic 
Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia: PDI).  This move was called the 
“simplification” of parties, and the government prohibited the establishment of 
other parties.  Moreover, these two parties were not permitted to set up 
regional chapters below the level of the district/city (kabupaten/kota), which was 
the second-tier level of local government, and they were prohibited from 
carrying out political campaigning at the village level.  The activities of each 
party’s central executive were kept under constant government surveillance, 
                                                        
6 The four major parties in the 1950s were the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional 
Indonesia: PNI), which was a secular-nationalist party established by Soekarno, the first 
president, during the struggle for independence; the Nahdlatula Ulama (NU), whose 
support base was in traditionalist Islam: the Masyumi which advocated modernist Islam; 
and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia: PKI).  These four parties 
were about equal in strength in the first post-independence election in 1955, each garnering 
more or less 20% of the vote. 
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and the election of party heads needed substantial government consent.   
     While the old political parties were weakened organizationally by 
government intervention, the Soeharto government built up Golkar as a means 
to control the legislature.  Golkar was composed of civil servant cooperatives, 
the veteran’s association, and other official organizations, enabling it to mobilize 
support from the village level through its network of civil servants.  During 
the Soeharto period, Golkar strengthened its organizational base as the 
government’s party while other parties saw their organizational structure 
weakened.  Since democratization in 1998, Golkar has maintained its 
organizational strength (Tomsa 2008).  Although civil servants are prohibited 
by law from joining political parties, Golkar has maintained its strength 
through its local network among the politico-economic elite.   
     When party activities were liberalized after democratization, over 200 
parties were established.  However, the parties that have been able to maintain 
organizational strength are those that have roots going back to the 1950s.  
These are the PDIP, established by one of Soekarno’s daughters, the 
Megawati-led opposition group within the PDI, and the PPP with its 
organizational base set in the Soeharto era.  The PKB, which is supported by 
the NU, Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, and the PAN, supported by 
Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization, also have succeeded in 
establishing themselves since both the NU and Muhammadiyah have experience 
in party politics going back to the 1950s.   
     Of new parties established since democratization, the only party that has 
successfully set up a strong organizational base is the PKS.  It is an Islamist 
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party that arose from Islamic religious movements on university campuses 
during the Soeharto period (Hasan 2009).  Modeled on the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, young Islamist intellectuals and activists in the PKS 
made steady effort to strengthen their organizational base, and now the PKS is 
as strong an organization as the Golkar.   
     The introduction of direct presidential elections in 2004 prompted the 
emergence of a new type of political party, the personal party, whose sole aim is 
to make a leading politician the president.  Typical of such a party is the PD, 
which was established to make Yudhoyono the president.  Yudhoyono was one 
of the top army elite who performed ably in strategic posts in the military.  He 
went into politics when he was appointed a minister in the Abdurrahman 
Wahid cabinet.  In July 2001, when Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached and 
vice-president Megawati became the new president, he ran unsuccessfully 
against a party politician in the vice-presidential election in the MPR.  
Yudhoyono and his supporters recognized the need to have their own party 
organization to pursue their political objectives.  When establishing his new 
party, he took as his model the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party of Thai prime minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra (Setiawan & Nainggolan 2004, 172-174).  He did this 
because he noted that after only three years from its establishment, the TRT 
successfully secured a majority in parliament in the 2001 Thai general election, 
making its leader, Thaksin, the prime minister.   
     The PD performed remarkably well in the 2004 general election, becoming 
the fourth largest party in the parliament and successfully making Yudhoyono 
the new president.  This result prompted other political figures to set up their 
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own personal parties.  In particular, powerful politicians who are about to lose 
a primary election in a major party choose to organize their own parties and 
run in the presidential election.  Two personal parties, Hanura and Gerindra, 
took part in the 2009 general election.  Former military commander and 
defense minister Wiranto established Hanura following his bitter experience in 
the previous presidential election.  In 2004, although he won the Golkar 
primary to run for president as the party-backed candidate, Wiranto could not 
get the party’s full support because he lacked a strong constituency inside 
Golkar and he lost in the first-round of the presidential election.7  Realizing 
how difficult it would be for him to run as a candidate from an existing party 
where he did not have a support base, he decided to set up his own party, 
Hanura.  A similar situation faced Prabowo, the former Army Strategic 
Reserve commander and Soeharto’s son-in-law.  Seeing little chance to be 
nominated as the presidential candidate from Golkar, he set up his own party, 
Gerindra.8 
     The above discussion looked at the two kinds of political parties that have 
come into existence since the introduction of direct presidential in 2004.  In the 
next section, we will discuss the relationship between differences in party 
organization and the effects of presidentialism. 
 
 
                                                        
7 Wiranto tried to run in the 1999 presidential election in the MPR as the Golkar candidate, 
but he failed to get the party’s support. 
8 Prabowo sought Golkar’s nomination as presidential candidate for the 2004 election, but 
he lost in the primary. 
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B. Party Organization and Presidentialization 
Taking up the question of whether there are any presidentialized polical parties 
in Indonesia, we can logically argue that personal parties, aimed at making a 
specific politician the president, are not presidentialized because in such a party, 
the leader him/herself is the “principal”, and the party members are the 
“agents”.  The leader, as the “principal”, delegates to the party members the 
responsibility of garnering the maximum number of votes and supporting the 
government if the leader wins the presidency.  If party members as the “agents” 
disobey their party leader as the “principal”, the “principal” can freely replace 
the “agents”.  Since the president elected from a personal party is also the 
highest leader of his party, the separation of executive and legislative functions 
never occurs inside party.  Thus, the principal-agent problem is irrelevant in a 
personal party, where there exists an opposite delegation relationship from that 
of a presidentialized party.   
     Of the three political leaders (Yudhoyono, Prabowo, Wiranto) who have 
personal parties that have successfully won seats in the parliament since 2004, 
Wiranto, who heads Hanura, is the only one who is the formal leader of his 
party.  Gerindra’s Prabowo is not the party chairman, but the chariman of the 
party’s Advisory Council.  Yudhoyono of PD ran in the presidential elections 
of 2004 and 2009 without holding any formal post in the party.  It was not until 
2010 that he assumed the post of chairman of the party’s Advisory Council.  
Nevertheless, there has been no conflict between the PD and the Yudhoyono 
government.  The PD always supports the government and votes for any 
government-submitted bill as the ruling party in the parliament.  The daily 
18 
 
administration of the party is executed by the central executive council, but 
every important political decision has to be made with Yudhoyono’s consent.  
The situation is the same in Gerindra where Prabowo chairs the Advisory 
Council. In both parties, the real political leader controls all the activities of the 
parties as an “adviser”.  This kind of party structure is quite similar to that of 
Golkar under the Soeharto regime.  Although President Soeharto never 
touched the daily administration of Golkar, he supervised the party as the 
chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council and appointed a close aide as the 
party chairman thereby keeping full control over the whole organization.   
     Looking at whether the well-organized parties have been presidentialized 
with the introduction of direct presidential election, the most presidentialized is 
Golkar.  This was strikingly displayed in the 2004 presidential election.  In the 
parliamentary elections that year that preceded the presidential election, the 
PDIP, winner of the 1999 elections, suffered a huge defeat while Golkar was able 
to maintain its number of seats thereby regaining its position as the largest 
party.  With the aim of winning the upcoming presidential election, Golkar 
decided to hold its primary election at its national congress on 20 April to 
nominate an official candidate.  The chairman at that time was Akbar Tanjung, 
who had become a party member as a student activist during the Soeharto era.  
Akbar was confident in gaining the party’s nomination to run in the presidential 
election as he could point to his party’s achievements in the parliamentary 
elections.  However, he was under suspicion in connection with a corruption 
case at the National Logistics Board (Badan Urusan Logistik: Bulog), and some 
party members worried that it could affect his popularity.  This was one reason 
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why Golkar did not automatically nominate its chairperson as its official 
candidate, and instead held a party primary election as done in the United 
States (Tomsa 2006, 6-12).   
     Beginning the primary at local chapters from the district/city to provincial 
level in 2003, the candidates who survived and made it to the national congress 
in April were Akbar as well as the mass media tycoon Surya Paloh, 
conglomerate entrepreneur Abrizal Bakrie, Wiranto, and Prabowo.  Before the 
congress, Akbar was expected to be the strongest candidate due to his long-time 
membership and strong support in the party.  However, many regional 
chapters were unsure of Akbar’s popularity.  They voted for Wiranto, and 
Akbar failed to win his party’s nomination. 
     As the Golkar-nominated presidential candidate, Wiranto entered into a 
coalition with the PKB to get support from Islamic constituencies and selected 
the NU vice-chairman, Salahuddin Wahid, as his vice-presidential candidate.  
He set up his own campaign team and tried to take full advantage of Golkar’s 
party organization to mobilize the support of party members.  However, 
Golkar never actively backed Wiranto’s election campaign.  The party’s central 
executives backed Chairman Akbar and were rather reluctant to support 
Wiranto’s campaign since they worried that if Wiranto won the election, his 
increased influence in the party would become a serious threat to the existing 
party elite (Tomsa 2006, 12-17).  In the end, Wiranto failed to win the popular 
vote and was defeated in the first round of the presidential election in July.  
The dysfunction of the party machine in the election campaign can be seen in 
the election results: Wiranto got 22.2% of the vote, which was significantly 
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lower than the 37.2% of the total vote from the six parties that supported 
Wiranto in the April parliamentary elections.   
     The presidentialization of the Golkar party appeared in the 2004 
presidential election partly because the party introduced a candidate 
nomination process which reflected the interests of the local chapters.  Since 
the Soeharto era, Golkar had a centralized decision-making structure and 
hardly ever made final decisions in a bottom-up way.  In the 1999 presidential 
election in the MPR, the incumbent president, Habibie, dropped his candidacy 
from Golkar because the anti-Habibie faction and Akbar loyalists within the 
party opposed him, which allowed the MPR to pass a nonconfidence vote 
(Mietzner 2000).  But the power struggle within Golkar at that time was fought 
by various factions at the central level, indicating no significant change in party 
organizational structure.  Thus, the 2004 presidential election triggered a 
structural change in the party organization. 
     When Yudhoyono won the 2004 presidential election, his vice-president 
was Kalla, who was a Golkar party member but who had given up running in 
the election as the party’s official presidential candidate.  Soon after Kall was 
inaugurated as vice president, Golkar elected him as its new chairman at the 
party’s national congress in December 2004.  In the 2009 presidential election, 
Golkar nominated Kall, who had resigned as Yudhoyono’s vice president, as the 
party’s presidential candidate.  The voices of the local chapters were again 
quite influential in this nomination process.  After Kall was defeated in the 
presidential election, the national congress in October 2009 elected Abrizal 
Bakrie, who argued that Golkar should participate in the Yudhoyono’s second 
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coalitional government.  It is assumed that chairman Bakrie will run in the 
2014 presidential election as the party’s candidate, but depending on the results 
of the parliamentary elections, demands for a change of candidate could arise 
from local chapters again.  Thus, the introduction of direct presidential 
elections has prompted Golkar to choose as its chairman not a dyed-in-the wool 
party member but a popular and financial-rich presidential candidate.   
     Since Golkar has yet to win a presidential election, we do not know 
whether a separation of the executive and legislative functions can occur 
between the president and the party organization.  However, in electing as its 
chairman not an active party member but politically inexperienced 
entrepreneurs shows that Golkar is making an effort to respond to the 
institutional change in presidential elections.  With the introduction of 
presidentialism as Indonesia’s executive institution, Golkar’s party organization 
has also been presidentialized.   
     However, Indonesia’s other organization-based parties have not been 
presidentialized.  In both long-existing parties (i.e., PDIP and PPP) and 
newly-established ones (i.e., PKB, PAN, Crescent Star Party [Partai Bulan 
Bintang: PBB], PKS), party members experienced in party operations and in the 
national legislatures have been elected as their chairpersons.9  The next section 
discusses what causes this difference among organization-based parties.   
 
                                                        
9 The only exception was PAN’s chairman, Soetrisno Bachir, between 2005 and 2010.  As 
an entrepreneur, Soetrisno was one of PAN’s financial supporters since its establishment 
but was never involved in political activities.  Nevertheless, he was strongly 
recommended for the chairmanship by the former chairman, Amien Rais, who announced 
his retirement from politics. 
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C. Electoral Strength and Presidentialization of Parties 
Many of the organization-based parties other than Golkar are Islamic parties.  
These are small or medium-sized parties that have gotten only five to ten 
percent of the vote in any of the parliamentary elections between 1999 and 2009.  
The total vote for Islamic parties decreased from 43.9% in the first 
post-independence election of 1955 to around 30% in the post-democratization 
elections.  Since there is little prospect for the constituencies of the Islamic 
parties to greatly increase, these parties must compete with each over their 
limited constituencies, making it extremely difficult for them to expand their 
vote.  As long as Islamic parties remain small, they have little chance of 
winning a presidential election.  In the 2004 presidential election, for example, 
candidates nominated by Islamic parties (Amien Rais nominated by the PAN 
and PKS, and Hamzah Haz by the PPP) suffered a complete defeat.  In the 
2009 presidential election, Islamic parties abandoned nominating their own 
candidates and supported the incumbent Yudhoyono. 
     Thus, it is difficult for small or mid-sized Islamic parties to participate in 
the presidential elections on their own resources.  The most rational electoral 
strategy for them is to exert leverage over secular parties in coalition 
negotiations by maximizing the number of seats they can gain in the 
parliamentary elections and seeking to nominate a vice-presidential candidate 
from their own parties.  Because of the difficult reality they face in running 
their own presidential candidates, the involvement of Islamic parties in the 
presidential elections has been limited; and their support of candidates from 
other parties has been indirect, so for the most part they have not been troubled 
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by differences of incentives between the presidential candidates they support 
and their own party organization.  This is why Islamic parties are not being 
presidentialized even under Indonesia’s present separation-of-power system. 
     The PDIP, like Golkar, is a secular organization-based party that has 
competed in the presidential elections, nominating its chairwoman, Megawati, 
as its own candidate.  Megawati held the office of president between 2001 and 
2004.  However, unlike Golkar, the PDIP has not been presidentialized.  The 
reason lies in personalized character of the PDIP’s organization.  Although an 
organization-based party, the PDIP has maintained party unity by relying upon 
the charisma of its first president, Soekarno, and his descendants as the symbol 
of the party.  The PDIP has not supposed any party member other than 
Megawati as its leader.  When Megawati retires from politics, her daughter 
Puan Maharani is expected to succeed to the leadership.  Although an 
organization-based party, the PDIP is also a personal party, and therefore it has 
not been presidentialized. 
 
III. Direct Elections of Local Government Heads and Party 
Organization 
 
When Indonesia moved from Soeharto’s centralized authoritarian 
decision-making to the liberalizing effects democratization, the political and 
economic dissatisfaction that erupted in various regions of the country 
threatened it with national disintegration.  In order to maintain national unity, 
the central government in 2001 gave the regions a large degree of autonomy.  
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Local politics have been democratized, and regional government heads are no 
longer appointed by the central government, but now elected directly by the 
people.  This section examines the effects of the direct electing of regional 
heads on political parties at the local level.   
     The revised law on regional administration (Law No. 32/2004) stipulates 
that Governors (Gubernur) at the first-tier local government level 
(province/propinsi) and the heads (Bupati and Wali Kota) at second-tier local 
government level (district/kabupaten and city/kota) are to be elected directly by 
the people.  Only parties (or coalitions of parties) that have over 15% of the 
seats in the local parliaments or 15% of the vote in local parliamentary elections 
can nominate candidates.  In 2007 the Constitutional Court ruled that an article 
of the 2004 regional administration law prohibiting an independent candidate 
from taking part in elections for regional head was unconstitutional. This was 
corrected in the second-revised law on regional administration (Law No. 
12/2008) which allows an independent candidate to participate in the elections 
provided that he/she can collect a certain number of supporter signatures.10 
     Case studies of regional local head elections (e.g., Vel 2005; Buehler and 
Tan，2007; Choi 2007; Mietzner 2009a; Erb and Sulistiyanto, eds., 2009, and etc.) 
commonly point out the decreased role played by political parties.  In local 
parliaments, where we can see more polarization than in the national 
parliament, party coalitions have become a necessity to nominate candidates.  
Yet, many of candidates are not party members, but bureaucrats who have 
                                                        
10 Independent candidates have to submit a collection of signatures ranging from 3-6.5% of 
the total regional population depending on the size of the region’s total population. 
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administrative capabilities and a network with the political and economic elite 
at the local level, or who are financially rich entrepreneurs.11  The reasons why 
party members cannot be nominated as official candidates are that parties 
simply do not have popular figures within their cadres or that financially weak 
local chapters depend on non-party figures who can finance a local political 
campaign (Mietzner 2010). 
     Golkar offers an example of party politics at the local level.  According to 
Buehler (2009), Golkar lost in 63% of the regional head elections held between 
2005 and early 2006.  The reason was that powerful politicians in local chapters 
demanded that they be nominated as official candidates although unpopular 
among voters.  Surprised at these results, the party’s central executive council 
reconsidered its local election strategy.  Now the party relies on pre-election 
public opinion surveys to select as its official candidates those people who can 
collect the popular vote, whether they are party members or outsiders. 
     It is difficult to know what has happened in other parties as scholarly 
studies are still limited.  But judging from the various reports on conflicts in 
the parties between the central executive council and local chapters, it would 
appear that their situations are similar to that facing Golkar.  While local 
chapters propose the nomination of local powerful party politicians as 
candidates, the central executive councils in Jakarta invite external figures who 
have a good chance of winning and large financial resources (Hadiz 2004; Choi 
                                                        
11 For example, Rinakit (2005) found that in 90 cases of regional head elections held in 2005, 
87% of thos elected were already incumbents or were bureaucrats.  Mietzner (2010) also 
reports that in 50 cases of regional head elections held in 2005, 36% of candidates were 
bureaucrats, 28% entrepreneurs, 22% party members or local legislators, and 8% were 
veterans. 
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2007).  The conflict between the central executive council and local chapters 
sometimes leads to the dismissal of local executive council members or a split in 
the parties in elections. 
     The examination above indicates that political parties in Indonesia have 
experienced an organizational transformation since the direct election of 
regional heads was introduced.  At the local level small and mid-sized parties 
have an opportunity to win election, and they do not necessarily nominate a 
charismatic leader as a candidate.  Thus, the separation-of-power system may 
have a stronger influence on party organization at local level than it does at the 
national level.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This article analyzed how the introduction of direct presidential elections after 
democratization has affected party organization in Indonesia.  Presidentialism 
in Indonesia has not directly caused the presidentialization of political parties.  
While an organization-based party like Golkar can be described as 
presidentialized, small and mid-sized parties have not been presidentialized 
because they seek to maximize the number of votes they can garner in 
parliamentary elections rather than in presidential elections, and they seek to 
participate in a coalition government as one of the ruling parties.  Personal 
parties established by powerful politicians cannot logically be presidentialized 
because the party leader him/herself is the “principal”.  The case study of 
Indonesian presidentialism and politlcal parties implies that the effect of the 
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executive institution on party organization will be reduced due to the weakness 
of the party system and party organization in newly democratizing countries.  
At the same time, however, this study indicates that the separation of powers in 
the political system seems to affect party organization more strongly at the local 
level than it does at the national level.   
     When we analyze the relationship between the executive institution and 
party organization, especially in newly democratizing countries, it may be 
necessary to consider the time of institutional consolidation.  We may also 
need to consider the underdevelopment of party organization or the instability 
of the party system, both of which will affect the relationship between the 
executive institution and the parties.12  If the direct electing of the president is 
introduced into a country where political parties are organizationally 
underdeveloped, strong politicians are apt to establish their own personal 
parties in every election.  Thus influence of presidentialism on party 
organization varies among the presently democratizing countries. 
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